Our Security Research Team has built and deployed a rule to help protect customers of our next-gen WAF against the recently announced Confluence Server OGNL injection vulnerability, CVE-2021-26084.

Modern applications need modern security tools that include flexible deployment, DevOps support, and strong API protection. Here are the six most important characteristics of modern web app and API security tools.

Companies using an average of 11 web application and API security tools should be able to rest easy, but the vast majority of them report successful attacks are still getting through. These legacy tools aren’t cutting it.

When we acquired Signal Sciences, we put a stake in the ground as a company that cares about the complete delivery path and making it not just resilient and performant, but inherently secure as well. Here’s our update on that mission.

Today, we launched Fastly Secure packages, a unified web app and API security solution that provides “right-sized” protection for any organization at a spend level that works for a variety of budgets.

Here are four repeatable steps that will help you pay down your security technical debt, make your apps and APIs more secure, and move you toward consolidated security tooling.

As the internet landscape gets more complex, more API driven, and more distributed, many security and IT professionals are left wondering — why aren’t the security tools that were good enough a few years ago good enough now?

How to accelerate your WAF visibility from 0 to 100MPH

We released a new report today in partnership with ESG Research that reveals some fascinating insights into the state of web application security tooling.

Requests passing through Fastly can be transformed in many ways. In this example, we’ll show you how to use enriched requests and our next-gen WAF to help you make more informed security decisions.

Our new Response Security Service provides direct, 24/7 access to our Customer Security Operations Center to help you prepare for and respond when you suspect an attack.

After years of helping protect companies across a variety of industries, we’ve come to recognize four common risk attack types. Here’s how they work and how to counter them.

The legacy WAF isn’t ubiquitous because it’s the perfect technology. Its success comes down to being mandated, despite four ways it often fails.

While some bots are benign search engine crawlers or website health monitors, others are on the prowl with nefarious intent, looking to execute account takeovers and compromise APIs. In this post, we’ll look at how to tell them apart in order to allow the good bots and block the bad ones.

Alongside the Bytecode Alliance, Fastly’s WebAssembly team recently led a rigorous security assessment of Cranelift, an open-source, next-generation code generator for use in WebAssembly to provide sandbox security functionality.

As Kubernetes has become widespread for container orchestration needs, it’s natural for security questions to arise. Here are answers to the Kubernetes questions we hear most often.

The bug identified in the Cranelift x64 backend performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, when the register allocator reloads a spilled integer value narrower than 64 bits. This interacts poorly with another optimization: the instruction selector elides a 32-to-64-bit zero-extend operator when we know that an instruction producing a 32-bit value actually zeros the upper 32 bits of its destination register. Hence, the x64 compiler relies on these zeroed bits, but the type of the value is still i32, and the spill/reload reconstitutes those bits as the sign extension of the i32’s MSB.

The bug identified in the Cranelift x64 backend performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, when the register allocator reloads a spilled integer value narrower than 64 bits. This interacts poorly with another optimization: the instruction selector elides a 32-to-64-bit zero-extend operator when we know that an instruction producing a 32-bit value actually zeros the upper 32 bits of its destination register. Hence, the x64 compiler relies on these zeroed bits, but the type of the value is still i32, and the spill/reload reconstitutes those bits as the sign extension of the i32’s MSB.

We recently discovered a compiler bug in part of the WebAssembly compiler that we use for Compute@Edge, that could have allowed a WebAssembly module to access memory outside of its sandboxed heap. But because of the people, processes, and tools we have in place, the bug was caught and patched on our infrastructure before it was exploited.

Throwing new security tools at new threats results in scattershot protection and builds technical debt. Organizations need uniform protection for applications and APIs, regardless of where they live.